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I. INTRODUCTION
Whistleblower cases are complicated, protracted and difficult
to resolve since they inevitably involve complex and contradictory
perspectives. To the employee, whistleblower protection is a
“shield” against an adverse employment action if he or she reports
an employer’s suspected violation of law. To the employer, a
whistleblower suit is often viewed as a “sword” used by poor
performing employees to avoid termination. To the legislature and
courts, whistleblower protection is “public policy” since it
safeguards the public from corporate misconduct by protecting
insiders who report illegalities. It is from this public policy
perspective that the Minnesota Supreme Court made an important
change in whistleblower law in the 2002 term. However, it is a
change that is unlikely to make Minnesota whistleblower cases any
less complicated, shorter or easier to resolve.
Whistleblower protection, an exception to the general rule of
at-will employment, has been in effect in Minnesota since 1987.
Since that time, a body of case law has developed, chiefly at the
court of appeals level, that has provided the employer with a useful
defense—the “public policy” requirement.
Under this
requirement, a plaintiff invoking whistleblower protection needed
to prove that the reported violation was not a minor illegality or
internal issue, but one involving “public policy”; i.e., a reported
violation that implicates the broader interests of society—the
1
public’s “morals, health, safety and welfare.” Many Minnesota
whistleblower cases have been dismissed or settled due to the
public policy requirement.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has now eliminated the public
policy requirement. In Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota
2
Women’s Center, Inc., the court peeled back layers of somewhat
conflicting case law and looked to the actual language of the state
whistleblower statute, which says nothing about a public policy
requirement. The court applied standard canons of construction
to overturn the line of cases that had established the requirement.
This article examines the Anderson-Johanningmeier decision in
light of the history of the public policy requirement in Minnesota
and its previous effect on whistleblower litigation. It offers some
1. Donahue v. Schwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth, P.A., 586 N.W.2d
811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
2. 637 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 2002).
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reflections on how Anderson-Johanningmeier fundamentally changes
the very concept of whistleblower protection—assuming the court’s
holding is not undone by the Minnesota Legislature. This article
concludes with predictions concerning the case’s potential impact
on the practical realities of whistleblower litigation and
employment counseling.
II. W HISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO ANDERSON-J OHANNINGMEIER
A. The Minnesota Whistleblower Statute
Although there have been whistleblowers since Adam told on
Eve, whistleblower protection did not arrive in Minnesota until
1987 when it came into existence due to the almost simultaneous
3
passage of the state whistleblower statute, which codified the right,
and issuance of the appellate decision in Phipps v. Clark Oil &
4
Refining Corp., which began its judicial interpretation. Since no
common law right existed prior to the passage of the statute,
whistleblower law in Minnesota has been a matter of statutory
interpretation.
By adopting the whistleblower statute, the Minnesota
Legislature recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge
and an exception to at-will employment. The statute, in essence,
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who
refuses to commit an illegal act or who, in good faith, reports the
employer’s violation or suspected violation of any federal or state
5
law.
Although prominent in employment law practice, the statute is
not easy to find. It is buried deep in the general state employment
law chapter under the bland and rather misleading title “Disclosure
of Information by Employees.” In pertinent part, the statute
provides:
Subdivision 1. Prohibited action. An employer shall not
discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate
against, or penalize an employee regarding the
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because:
3.
4.
5.

M INN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000) (amending M INN. STAT. § 181.932 (1999)).
408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
See M INN. STAT. § 181.932.
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(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an
employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental
body or law enforcement official;
(b) the employee is requested by a public body or office
to participate in an investigation, hearing, inquiry;
(c) the employee refuses an employer’s order to perform
an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact
to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or
regulation adopted pursuant to law, and the employee
informs the employer that the order is being refused for
that reason; or
(d) the employee, in good faith, reports a situation in
which the quality of health care services provided by a
health care facility, organization, or health care provider
violates a standard established by federal or state law or a
professionally recognized national clinical or ethical
standard and potentially places the public at risk of harm.
****
Subd. 3. False disclosures. This section does not permit
an employee to make statements or disclosures knowing
that they are
false or that they are in reckless disregard of
6
the truth.
The section of the statute at issue in almost all whistleblower
litigation is subdivision 1(a), providing protection for an employee
who reports a suspected violation of law. It is in the context of
subdivision 1(a) cases that the public policy requirement has been
most often applied.
Since the statute’s adoption, the Minnesota Legislature has
made three subsequent revisions to the law, none substantial and
7
none directly addressing a public policy requirement. As discussed
below, the fact that the legislature has not substantially revised the

6. Id.
7. In 1988 language was added to subdivision 1, clause (c) of the statute
regarding protection of employees asked to do illegal acts. 1988 Minn. Laws 915.
The second amendment of subdivision 1 occurred in 1997 when the legislature
added a new clause to the subdivision regarding health care institutions. 1997
Minn. Laws 2737. Finally, in 1999, the legislature recently revised subdivision 2 of
the whistleblower statute which deals with government disclosures and the identity
of the whistleblower. 1999 Minn. Laws 1615. Other than these minor or peripheral
revisions, the statute has remained in tact since 1987.
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statute was of great significance to the Anderson-Johanningmeier
court’s elimination of the public policy requirement.
B. The Emergence of the Public Policy Requirement in Case
Interpretation Prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier
The “public policy” requirement for general whistleblower
protection emerged from a series of court interpretations of the
public interest meant to be enforced by the whistleblower statute.
To appreciate the implications of Anderson-Johanningmeier for
Minnesota employment law, it is necessary to review this rather
uncertain case history.
The public policy requirement first appeared in Phipps v. Clark
8
Oil & Refining Corp., a simple case of an employee being told to do
something illegal, a situation now covered by subdivision 1(c) of
the Whistleblower Act. Phipps was employed at a self-service gas
station when a customer asked him to illegally pump leaded
9
gasoline into her car. When his manager ordered him to do it,
10
Phipps refused and was immediately fired.
The trial court
dismissed Phipps’s challenge to the legality of his termination on
the basis that Minnesota law did not recognize a public policy
11
exception to at-will employment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
found that a cause of action existed for illegal termination by virtue
of the common law nature of the at-will employment doctrine and
the broad acceptance of the whistleblower protection in other
12
common law jurisdictions. Since whistleblower protection was
widely adopted in other states, the court of appeals effectively
created a Minnesota whistleblower or “public policy exception” to
the employment-at-will doctrine, making an employer liable at
common law if it discharges an employee for “reasons that
13
contravene a clear mandate of public policy.” From the phrase
“clearly mandated public policy,” the public policy requirement was
born.
Between the court of appeals’ decision in Phipps and its review
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota legislature
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 592.
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enacted the whistleblower statute. While this made the supreme
court decision somewhat anticlimactic, the court did uphold the
court of appeal’s decision citing with apparent approval its “clear
14
mandate of public policy” language. Because the right was now
statutory, the supreme court’s analysis of the nature and scope of
the tort was abbreviated. As it turns out, what was left unsaid
became quite important over time.
Although it may have seemed at the time that the legislature’s
enactment of the whistleblower statute superceded the potential
impact of the Phipps decisions, these decisions significantly affected
the development of whistleblower law by their “clear mandate of
public policy” concept. The idea that whistleblower protection
should be accorded to only those employees who reported
violations that involved the “clear mandate of public policy” came
to mean that there was a basis to distinguish reports with
whistleblower protection from reports without whistleblower
protection. The public policy requirement became a part of the
fabric of the ongoing interpretation of the statute. It evolved early
on in a line of cases that has now been overturned by AndersonJohanningmeier.
The public policy requirement first fully appeared in Vonch v.
15
Carlson Companies, Inc., two years after Phipps and the passage of
the statute. In Vonch, the plaintiff, an employee in the defendants’
security department, reported that his supervisor was committing
16
theft and fraud through his expense account. Management
assured the plaintiff that the matter would be properly
17
investigated. The investigation confirmed the allegations but the
employer took no action against the supervisor since no significant
18
loss resulted from the actions.
Subsequently, Vonch was informed that his department would
19
be eliminated. He was offered two different positions with
significant pay cuts, both of which he rejected, believing that the
employer wanted him to reject these offers and quit, which he
20
did. He then brought suit claiming wrongful discharge and

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 1987).
439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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21

violation of the Whistleblower Act. The trial court granted the
22
employer summary judgment. The court of appeals upheld the
dismissal on the basis that the public policy exception to at-will
employment was established to protect the general public from injury
due to a company’s illegal acts and not applicable when there is no
general public interest in enforcement of the violation reported:
The public policy exception to at-will employment was
carved out to protect the general public from injury due to
a company’s neglect or affirmative bad act. Here, the
public interest in having Carlson’s chief corporate security
officer charged with corporate travel and expense
improprieties is minimal, at best. The public does not
have an interest in a business’s internal management
problems. If actions are allowed when the public interest
is only marginally affected rather than where it is “clearly
mandated,” the law of at-will employment will be seriously
jeopardized, and the public policy23 “exception” to at-will
employment will become the rule.
Thus, from the common law concept of the public policy exception
in at-will employment came the public policy requirement that state
whistleblower protection law does not apply to cases where the
24
public’s interest was “marginal.” Seen another way, the analysis of
the public’s interest in cases such as Phipps in which an employee
was asked to do something illegal became part of the analysis of
cases in which an employee reported illegal employer misconduct as
in Vonch.
The Minnesota Supreme Court appeared to acknowledge the
validity of the public policy requirement in Williams v. St. Paul
25
Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. Plaintiff Williams was employed as a
pharmacy technician and claimed that a superior became
26
interested in her and repeatedly asked her out. When she
27
continually rebuffed his advances, he became openly hostile.
28
Williams met with her supervisor to report this behavior. The
employer’s sexual harassment coordinator investigated the claims

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id.
551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
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29

and concluded they were meritless.
At the same time, her superior submitted reports to the
employer concluding that the plaintiff’s workplace conduct had
30
been inappropriate and her performance poor. This report was
31
supported by other employee complaints about her attitude. She
was then fired for inadequate performance, failure to improve work
32
quality, and for disruptive behavior. She then brought suit,
33
claiming retaliation under the whistleblower statute. While the
Minnesota Supreme Court disposed of the claim on other
34
grounds, in a lengthy footnote the court noted that the image
suggested by the whistleblower statute’s very name—that of an
officer blowing a whistle—underscores the point that the statute
was designed to protect employee actions taken for the protection
of the public and not actions taken for an employee’s self-interest:
The popular title of the Act connotes an action by a
neutral—one who is not personally and uniquely
affronted by the employer’s unlawful conduct but rather
one who “blows the whistle” for the protection of the
general public or, at the least, some third person or
persons in addition to the whistleblower. Were it
otherwise, every allegedly wrongful termination of
employment could, with a bit of ingenuity, be cast as a
claim pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (1994). Because
this case was tried and decided on the basis of exclusivity,
we have no occasion to rule on the validity of the cause of
action asserted as a whistleblower’s claim in Williams’
complaint, but we could, in the alternative,
have ruled
35
that no such cause of action exists here.
To the employment law bar, the public policy requirement
36
appeared to be endorsed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
As recently as 1999, a reported appellate whistleblower case
upheld the requirement. In Donahue v. Schwegman, Lundberg,

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 485-86.
35. Id. at 484 n.1.
36. For a survey and discussion of the several unreported Minnesota Court of
Appeals cases that enforced the public policy requirement see David J. Hoekstra,
Blowing the Whistle, 1995 M INN. BENCH & BAR, Feb. 1995, at 17.
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37

Woessner & Kluth, P.A., the plaintiff, an associate at a law firm,
learned that her firm attached a surcharge to the cost of all long
distance phone calls made from the firm which was automatically
38
deducted from employee paychecks without disclosure. She
demanded that the firm disclose the billing and deduction payroll
practice to all employees and even hired independent counsel,
whose investigation concluded that the practice was likely illegal
39
and unethical. In response, the firm implemented new long
40
distance procedures.
Following these incidents, the plaintiff was placed on an
alternative compensation plan, which reduced her minimum
billing goal and part of her salary unless she achieved the original
41
yearly billing goal. She left the firm and brought suit under the
whistleblower statute, alleging that her report of the unlawful long
42
distance surcharge led to her discharge. The trial court dismissed
the claim, concluding that there was no public interest in the law
43
firm’s billing and payroll deduction practices. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that her report concerning an internal
44
payroll deduction procedure failed to implicate public policy.
Donahue had argued that since all statutes are designed to
protect the public, her report necessarily involved the public
45
interest and thus met the public policy requirement. The court of
appeals rejected this argument and concluded that the public
policy requirement is not met by just reporting any illegality, but
only by reporting illegal acts that implicate the broader interests of
society:
[A]lthough the legislature intended the whistleblower
statute to bring sweeping protection to employees who
report wrongdoing by employers, we do not believe the
intent was to obliterate employment at-will. Instead, both
the common-law public policy exception and the
whistleblower statute only protect employees who expose
violations of law designed to promote the public’s morals,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

586 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 814.
Id.
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46

health, safety and welfare.
The Donahue court’s reasoning presents a “horn book-like”
application of the public policy requirement and has had the air of
a discussion of settled law, but as Anderson-Johanningmeier would
prove, the issue was far from settled.
C. The Recent Emergence of Counter-Precedent
Even before the court of appeals issued the Donahue decision,
the Minnesota Supreme Court had signaled trouble for the
continued existence of the public policy requirement in Hedglin v.
47
City of Willmar. Here, the plaintiff and other former firefighters
brought an action under the whistleblower statute alleging the fire
chief and the city had violated the statute by retaliating against
them after they reported the falsification of fire department roll
48
call sheets and drunken driving by firefighters. The trial court
dismissed the claim, concluding that such matters were only
internal management issues that did not implicate public policy,
49
and thus were not protected by the whistleblower statute. But the
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the falsification of roll
call sheets was an illegal taking of public funds, and thus protected
50
under the statute.
On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged the common law public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, but declined to extend this
51
requirement to the whistleblower statute. The court concluded
that because the reports of roll sheet falsifications and of firefighter
intoxication implicated possible state law violations, the
52
whistleblower statute provided protection. The court did not
accept the defendant’s argument that the statute requires the
53
reports to implicate a mandated public policy. However, it
declined to determine whether the public policy requirement is the
law of the state because it found that the misconduct reported by
the plaintiffs did in fact implicate mandated public policy:
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
582 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1998).
Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902.
Id.
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[W]e conclude that we need not decide whether the
public policy requirement applies to the whistleblower
statute because here the misconduct reported did
implicate clearly mandated public policy. Grove reported
that firefighters were driving fire trucks while drunk. The
firefighters were allegedly driving city vehicles on city
streets while under the influence of alcohol and could
have caused substantial damage to other drivers,
pedestrians, or property.
This conduct certainly
implicates public policy. Hedglin and Lundquist reported
that the city paid Schroeder for fire calls that he did not
attend because someone falsified the roll call sheets.
Courts from other jurisdictions have concluded that
public policy is implicated when the reported
violation
54
implicates the government or public funds.
While the holding of Hedglin was narrow, the supreme court
took the opportunity to analyze the whistleblower statute and
precedent in such a way as to alert the state employment law bar
(and, as the Court would state in Anderson-Johanningmeier, the state
legislature) that it saw no reason to believe that the public policy
requirement should be part of whistleblower statute interpretation:
When we interpret statutes, we must ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature. If the words of
the statute are free from ambiguity, we will not disregard
them. Therefore, any statutory construction must begin
with the language of the statute. The whistleblower
statute protects reports made in good faith of a violation
or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule
adopted pursuant to law. We conclude that this language
clearly and unambiguously protects reports made of a
violation of any55 federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law.
At the very least, Hedglin did not bode well for the public
policy requirement. However, the requirement had not vanished.
In deciding a 2000 whistleblower case that turned on questions of
good faith and violation of law, the supreme court summarized
Minnesota whistleblower protection as follows:
When interpreting the whistleblower statute, we have
suggested that it protects the conduct of a neutral party
who blows the whistle for the protection of the general
54.
55.

Id. at 903.
Id. at 901-02 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 8
FINAL BUETHE A-J.DOC

306

10/28/2002 10:44 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

public or, at the least, some third
person or persons in
56
addition to the whistleblower.
Given such language in a supreme court case, as well as the
endorsement of the public policy requirement by the court of
appeals in Donahue, the impact of Hedglin on the public policy
requirement was open to question.
Yet the potential influence of Hedglin can be seen in Bertagnoli
v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc., an unpublished 1998 court of
appeals decision from a different court panel than the Donahue
57
Court. Plaintiff Bertagnoli was an at-will employee working on
58
projects for a particular customer. She alleged that her employer
had manipulated the number of hours employees had worked on
59
the customer’s accounts and fraudulently inflated the bills. She
told her supervisor that she believed the practices were illegal and
60
unethical. Subsequently, the employer informed the plaintiff they
had lost confidence in her and they were terminating her
61
employment for poor work performance. She filed a complaint
under the whistleblower statute, alleging that her employer
62
terminated her for reporting violations of state and federal law.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to make a report
as required under the statute, and that the illegal billing practices
63
failed to implicate public policy, as required by the statute.
The court of appeals reversed, however, determining that
Bertagnoli’s statements to her supervisor constituted a report
64
under the statute. It also declined to read the public policy
requirement into the whistleblower act, since the plain language of
the statute does not require that a clearly-mandated public policy
65
be implicated in the employee’s report. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Hedglin for the proposition that the
whistleblower statute should be read according to its plain
language:
56. Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
57. No. C6-98-541, 1998 WL 665085, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App., Nov. 17, 1998).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *2-4.
64. Id. at *5.
65. Id. at *4-5.
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The Supreme Court in Hedglin declined to read an
additional requirement into the whistleblower act, and we
decline to do so as well. Because the plain language of
the whistleblower act does not require that a clearly
mandated public policy be implicated in an employee’s
report of wrongdoing, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment against Bertagnoli on the ground that
she had
not shown such a policy to be implicated in this
66
case.
Thus the implications of Hedglin for the public policy requirement
were unfolding, and would play themselves out fully in AndersonJohanningmeier.
D. The Practical Realities of the Public Policy Requirement Before
Anderson-Johanningmeier
As seen in the cases described above, prior to AndersonJohanningmeier, the public policy requirement was a part of
Minnesota whistleblower law, but its status was becoming uncertain,
and its place in whistleblower law was far from settled. In practice,
it was very useful to employers in cases where an employee’s report
arose from routine wage or workplace disputes that could be
correctly characterized as internal matters. Of course, in cases in
which important laws were involved the defense was not employed.
In cases where the employees’ report involved solely internal
matters, the public policy requirement was particularly problematic
to employees because it was a threshold requirement and a
question of law. As such, it was a common basis for early summary
judgment motions. The public policy requirement avoided the
necessity of litigating questions of fact about the employee’s intent
and the causal link between the report and the adverse
employment action. In this way, it was a force for early and modest
settlement of many lawsuits.
The doctrine was, undeniably, a “rule of practice” in
Minnesota employment law for over fourteen years—even though
its validity had a growing uncertainty, especially in light of Hedglin.
However, even after Hedglin, its tenuous existence was perhaps less
apparent to Minnesota practitioners then it might otherwise have
been given the requirement’s consistency with the common

66.

Id. at *5.
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interpretation of whistleblower protection in federal law and in
68
surrounding jurisdictions.
Thus, prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier, the public policy
requirement was useful to defendants and did not appear to be
unique to Minnesota law. The only problem was that it existed
nowhere in the text of the Minnesota whistleblower statute.

67. There is no general federal whistleblower law. But various federal statutes
provide protection against retaliation for whistleblowers as an adjunct to the
specific statutes’ principle objectives and, thus, by their own terms have a “built-in”
“public policy” requirement. That is, they do not involve unspecified illegal acts,
as does the Minnesota whistleblower statute, but specific misconduct for which the
important public policy being protected is part of the statute. For a list of federal
whistleblower laws see Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 103 n.28 (2000).
68. The public policy requirement in Minnesota law was consistent with limits
of whistleblower protection accorded employees in surrounding states, which can
be summarized as follows:
Iowa: Iowa courts recognize an exception to the employment at-will doctrine
where the discharge violates a well-recognized and defined public policy. Fogel v.
Trustees of Iowa Coll., 446 N.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Iowa 1989).
North Dakota: North Dakota also has a whistleblower statute; it applies to both
public and private employers. N.D.C.C. §34-01-20 (2002). This statute provides a
terminated employee a cause of action to bring a civil action for injunctive relief
or damages for a retaliatory discharge. N.D.C.C. §34-01-20 (4) (2002). Courts
have recognized that North Dakota’s statute is similar to Minnesota’s
whistleblower statute. Dahlberg v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of N.D., 625 N.W.2d 241,
253 (N.D. 2001).
South Dakota: South Dakota does not have a whistleblower statute, but case law
provides common law protection for whistleblowers when there has been a report
of an alleged violation of substantial public policy. Peterson v. Glory House of
Sioux Falls, 443 N.W.2d 653, 654 (S.D. 1989) (citing Johnson v. Kreiser’s, Inc., 433
N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988)). This public policy exception to at-will employment
is narrow and turns upon whether a termination is found to violate a clear
mandate of public policy. Dahl v. Combined Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 163, 167 (S.D.
2001).
Wisconsin: Wisconsin recognizes a public policy exception to at-will employment.
Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 452 (Wis. 2000).
Wisconsin courts have made clear that the exception to the general rule is a very
narrow one. Id. at 453 (citing Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
840-41 (Wis. 1983)). The employee has the burden of proving that the discharge
violated a clear mandate of public policy. Id. To obtain relief, a plaintiff must: (1)
first identify a fundamental and well-defined public policy in their complaint
sufficient to trigger the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine; and (2)
then demonstrate that the discharge violated that fundamental and well-defined
public policy. Id.
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III. ELIMINATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY REQUIREMENT
A. The Holding of Anderson-Johanningmeier
In Anderson-Johanningmeier the Minnesota Supreme Court
unequivocally eliminated the public policy requirement from state
whistleblower law. Precedent establishing the requirement was
overturned, and Minnesota law is in an important way different
from federal whistleblower protection or that of surrounding states
in that any reported violation of rule or law triggers whistleblower
protection.
In Anderson-Johanningmeier, plaintiffs were employees of a
women’s shelter whose jobs were eliminated after two female staff
workers raised a comparatively minor and quite internal labor law
69
violation with the executive director. The executive director had
instructed the plaintiff not to pay the vacation time of another
70
employee. This employee had first submitted a vacation request
that was approved by the executive director and then submitted her
71
resignation, taking effect soon after she returned from vacation.
One of the staff workers contacted the Minnesota Department of
Labor and inquired whether the executive director’s instruction
72
was appropriate. A labor department employee replied that it was
73
not and that the vacation pay needed to be given. After the
incident, the two staff workers claimed that the work atmosphere
74
turned hostile. Five months later, a staff restructuring occurred,
eliminating the positions held by the two staff workers who had
75
earlier confronted the executive director.
The women filed suit against the shelter alleging, among other
76
claims, that the shelter violated Minnesota’s whistleblower statute.
A jury found for the women and specifically awarded the two staff
77
workers a total of $88,000. However, the district court reversed
the jury on a JNOV motion, reasoning that the illegality reported
69. Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc. 673
N.W.2d 270, 271 (Minn. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 272.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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did not implicate public policy and, therefore, no whistleblower
78
statute violation occurred. The court of appeals affirmed on the
basis that the appellants did not demonstrate that what they
79
reported implicated public policy.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, finding explicitly that
a plaintiff alleging a violation of the Minnesota whistleblower
statute does not need to establish that the reported law violation
80
implicates public policy. As precedent, the court primarily relied
on its holding in Hedglin and the legislature’s failure to modify the
81
statute thereafter.
The majority opinion did not delve into the theory of public
policy requirement, review the history of whistleblower protection
in the development of the public policy exception law,
acknowledge the presence of the requirement in other
jurisdiction’s whistleblower laws, or rebut concerns that the
integrity of the at-will employment doctrine would be diminished
82
without the requirement. Rather, its analysis rested exclusively on
83
statutory construction. The court appeared to acknowledge that
the case precedent was confusing and contradictory, especially
when comparing the language of its Hedglin decision with the court
of appeal’s subsequent Donahue decision—-for which the supreme
court had not exercised discretionary review. Nonetheless, the
court found that its reading of the law in Hedglin was such as to put
the legislature on notice that it did not regard the public policy
84
requirement as a legitimate part of whistleblower construction.
Since the 1999 legislature amended the statute after the 1998
Hedglin case without including a public policy requirement, the
supreme court concluded that its analysis of the statute in Hedglin
85
had withstood legislative scrutiny. Thus, the elimination of the
public policy requirement was consistent with legislative intent:
“Because section 181.932, subd. 1(a), clearly and unambiguously
protects reports made of a violation of any federal or state law or
rule adopted pursuant to law, we will not look beyond its text to search

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 273-77.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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86

for an unexpressed public policy requirement.”
The court’s proposition that that the legislature’s silence in
response to Hedglin truly was consent to its dicta regarding the
public policy requirement may give one pause. It is, nonetheless,
undeniable that the plain language of the statute provides no
87
“hook” for the public policy requirement “hat.”
Thus, after fourteen years, the public policy requirement in
the Phipps, Vonch and Williams line of cases has come to an end.
Indeed, the losing plaintiff’s argument in Donahue, that all laws are
by definition clearly mandated public policies, proved prescient.
B. The Chief Justice’s Concurring Opinion
Although the court’s opinion was a straightforward exercise in
reading the plain language of the statute—-and a somewhat more
complicated exercise of distinguishing conflicting precedent—there is more to the decision. Chief Justice Blatz filed a concurring
opinion to specifically address the problems she foresees if the
88
public policy requirement were to be re-established by statute.
She focused on the common argument that failure to recognize a
public policy exception will lead courts to serve as “super-personnel
departments,” deciding mere internal dispute matters that would
89
now easily be filed as a whistleblower claim. To the Chief Justice,
the more critical public policy concern is raised by maintaining a
public policy requirement by which individual courts must
determine which violations qualify as a “clear mandate of public
90
policy” and which do not. Indeed, the concurrence contains
separation of powers undertones:
Recognizing that much legislation is hotly contested, are
the courts to sit as a “super legislature” to pass muster on
the worthiness of a law? And in divining what laws in fact
do not embody public policy, will the courts become an
unwitting partner with a minority of legislators who were
unsuccessful in their attempts to block a bill’s passage?
These concerns—in conjunction with an appreciation that
what one court may view as “pork” may be gruel in the
eyes of legislators working on behalf of their
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. (emphasis added).
See M INN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000).
Anderson-Johanningmeier, 637 N.W. 2d at 277 (Blatz, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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91

constituents—give me great pause.
In short, the Chief Justice’s concurrence takes AndersonJohanningmeier beyond pure statutory construction to a weighing of
equities and constitutionality. By pointing to the uncertainties and
subjectivity involved in implementing the requirement in a case-bycase basis, the Chief Justice was implicitly taking into account the
questionable realities of practice—-the search for the “right”
92
court.
Indeed, the concurrence reads like advice to the
legislature. It is, perhaps, a harbinger of how the court will regard
the constitutionality and enforceability of the public policy
requirement were it to be re-established by statutory amendment.
It also may be a tacit acknowledgment that it is a bit of a stretch to
conclude that the legislature’s silence in immediate response to
Hedglin’s dicta confirmed the legislature’s intent regarding the
public policy requirement. The concurrence seems to anticipate
that the topic is now much more likely to come front and center
93
before the state legislature.
C. The Immediate Implementation of Anderson-Johanningmeier
in Abraham v. County of Hennepin
Just one month after Anderson-Johanningmeier was decided, the
supreme court reaffirmed the elimination of the public policy
94
requirement in Abraham v. County of Hennepin. In Abraham, two
employees of a print shop were fired for allegedly improper work
95
behavior. This occurred after they had complained to their
supervisors that fumes in the workplace were making them ill and
one of them sent a written complaint to the Safety and Health
96
Division of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.
The issues on appeal were complex and resulted in a holding
that a constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury exists for
97
whistleblower cause of actions. For purposes of this article, the
case is noteworthy since the supreme court applied its month-old

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. 639 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2002).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 345-46. See Russell Pannier, Abraham’s Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265 (2002) for a persuasive critique of this
holding.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/8

18

Buethe: Everybody Likes a Tattletale?: The Minnesota Supreme Court's Elim
FINAL BUETHE A-J.DOC

10/28/2002 10:44 PM

2002] ELIMINATION OF THE “PUBLIC POLICY” REQUIREMENT

313

holding in Anderson-Johanningmeier and reaffirmed that a
whistleblower claim need not implicate a clearly mandated public
policy:
The county argues that appellants’ claims reflect only
appellants’ self-interest and do not implicate clearly
mandated public policy. In our recent decision in
Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Center,
we held that the protections of Minn. Stat. § 181.932,
subd. 1(a), are not limited to reports that implicate public
policy. Accordingly, we hold that the provision of the
Whistleblower Act that prohibits employer retaliation for
an employee’s report of a violation or suspected violation
of federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law,
Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a), does not require that an
employee’s report of a violation or suspected violation of
law or98rule adopted pursuant to law implicate public
policy.
Indeed, the Court concluded that not only need there be no
showing that the reported violation implicated public policy, but
the plaintiff need not even plead that a specific law or rule was
reported as violated, as long as such a law or rule exists:
A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law
that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as
there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to
law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the
employee reported the violation or suspected violation in
good faith, and the employee alleges facts that, if proven,
would constitute
a violation of law or rule adopted
99
pursuant to law.
In short, an employee whose complaint “implicates” a state or
federal law, the enforcement of which serves only the employee’s
100
interest, can claim whistleblower protection. Again, the basis for
this further liberalization of the whistleblower statutes’ application
is the plain language of the statute itself. Thus, within a month, the
supreme court eliminated the public policy requirement in
Anderson-Johanningmeier and demonstrated the effect of this
elimination in Abraham.

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 354 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 354-55.
See id.
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IV. IS ANDERSON-J OHANNINGMEIER A SEA CHANGE OR JUST A RIPPLE IN
THE POND?
Anderson-Johanningmeier settles the law in a way that affects the
very concept of whistleblower protection and impacts the practical
realities of employment litigation and counseling. However, the
long-term effect may not be as great as it may initially seem,
especially since the plain language of the statute provides
fundamental defenses that limit abuse of whistleblower
101
protection.
A. A Philosophical Change in Minnesota Whistleblower Law
From a conceptual point of view, Anderson-Johanningmeier is
intriguing since it alters the “three-part” perspective of traditional
whistleblower analysis. Minnesota whistleblower law now operates
on the general premise that the unfettered and unretaliated
reporting of any law is, by definition, in the public interest. The
perspectives of the employer, employee, and public are all still in
the analysis, but the weight now given to the public’s interest in
corporate compliance with the law is in one sense heightened and
in another sense diminished. It is heightened in so far as every law,
no matter whether its violation has a real impact on the public at
large, can trigger whistleblower protection. But it also seems
diminished in that there is no longer any real analysis of the
public’s actual interest in the particular violation. There is no
consideration given as to whether the underlying controversy
affected the rights or interests of anyone other than the employee.
In that sense, there is no real weighing of the public’s interest in
enforcing the violation reported, since protection against the
reporting of any violation of the law is presumed to be in the public
interest. This results in an absolute correlation between legality
and public policy. Looked at in this way, the three-part interests of
the employer, employee and public collapse into just the interests
of the employer and employee.
In other words, the traditional requirement that the employee
was acting like a police officer who “blows a whistle” to stop a
criminal in order to protect the interests of others is gone. In
whistleblower cases where the reported violation involves only the
legal interests of the employee, it is reasonable to ask if the “public
101.

M INN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000); see infra Part IV.C.
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interest” being protected is purely a legal construct.
But what is the alternative? As the Chief Justice points out,
implementation of the public policy requirement entails ongoing
judicial determinations of which specific laws actually implicate
public policy considerations. Implicit in the assumption is the
premise that not all laws have a public policy dimension—-a
premise that seems counterintuitive. Moreover, if an employer can
discharge an employee simply because a court decides that a
reported violation involves a purely internal matter, what does that
mean for subsequent employees who report the same violation?
The protection of future employees from being subject to the same
illegal conduct could be reasonably regarded as a “clearlymandated public policy,” since it involves the interests, or potential
interests, of persons other than just the employee.
Also, significant separation of powers concerns are inherent in
the requirement, since it calls upon a court to determine whether a
particular law is a “clearly mandated public policy” and its
enforcement important to protect the public “morals, health,
safety, and welfare.” Prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier, practitioners
knew that success in using the public policy requirement as a
defense turned in large part upon having the “right” judge
assigned to the case. Even if the public policy exception winnowed
out foolish or wasteful claims, its intrinsic subjectivity in all
probability cost many plaintiffs who reported employee misconduct
out of a sense of duty their day in court or caused them to devalue
their claim in settlement.
Finally, is it unfair or bad public policy to protect employees
who report illegal employer conduct that relates solely to internal
matters? Acting to correct such “internal illegalities” as overtime
violations, workplace safety violations, or denial of statutorilyrequired leave means little if the employee can be immediately
discharged or disciplined for reporting such infractions.
B. The Practical Impact of Anderson-Johanningmeier on
Whistleblower Litigation
Beyond such theoretical considerations is the practical impact
of Anderson-Johanningmeier. The case, of course, has no relevance in
serious cases where there is no reasonable basis to question that the
underlying reported violation has a public policy dimension. But
unquestionably, Anderson-Johanningmeier takes away a common
defense in cases in which a court could look upon the reported
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offense as solely an “internal” matter. As a result, such cases, and
there are many, will take longer to resolve. Thus, in all probability,
Anderson-Johanningmeier will foster more whistleblower claims in
Minnesota. The settlement costs for these claims will be higher
because the risk of judgment can no longer be cut off by a motion
to dismiss based on the public policy requirement.
In addition, Anderson-Johanningmeier now differentiates
Minnesota whistleblower protection from the protection provided
by the laws of surrounding states and federal whistleblower laws.
Practitioners cannot simply apply the same analysis to Minnesota
whistleblower claims that they apply to out-of-state or federal
claims. Since Minnesota’s whistleblower law is now more liberal in
its protection of the employee, conflict of laws considerations may
be quite important in Minnesota-related cases brought outside the
state.
C. The Increased Importance of the Remaining Statutory Defenses
All this being said, the impact of Anderson-Johanningmeier on
the practical realities of Minnesota whistleblower law may prove to
be less dramatic if the remaining statutory defenses “step up to the
plate” now that the public policy requirement has been kicked out
of the game—-or at least placed on the disabled list.
Following the protocol of Anderson-Johanningmeier and looking
strictly at the plain language of the statute, there are clear statutory
requirements that there be a good faith report of a suspected
illegality and a causal connection between the report and any
adverse employment action. These statutory requirements provide
traditional defenses that remain and should safeguard against
opening the floodgate to the unjust expansion of whistleblower
protection, even if post-Anderson-Johanningmeier whistleblower
litigation tests their strength.
According to the plain language of the statute, protected
conduct only exists when “the employee . . . reports a violation or
suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law
102
enforcement official.” This is a critical threshold requirement.
For example, if a terminated employee reported only a violation of
internal handbook or workplace policies, there would be no
statutorily protected conduct because no actual illegality was
102.

M INN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(a).
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involved. No matter what internal consternation such a report
might cause—-indeed, even if the report was undeniably the reason
for termination and the employer’s conduct seems retaliatory and
morally unfair—-such situations provide no whistleblower
protection. Thus, many actions that employees may assume are
protected are actually unprotected. This statutory requirement
that the report involve a suspected violation of a federal or state law
is an effective defense to potential whistleblower claims and
remains good law.
There is also a statutory good faith requirement. The statute
provides protection only when “the employee . . . in good faith,
103
reports a violation or suspected violation.” The statute “does not
permit an employee to make statements or disclosures knowing
104
that they are in reckless disregard of the truth.”
In Obst v. Microton, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court defined
this good faith analysis as looking at not only the content of the
violation alleged, but also at the employee’s purpose in making the
report:
Under the whistle-blower statute, establishing that an
employee reported violations or suspected violations of
law to his or her employer does not end the inquiry. The
critical question of whether those reports were made in
good faith must also be answered. In order to determine
whether a report of a violation of suspected violation of
law is made in good faith, we must look not only at the
content of the report, but also at the reporter’s purpose in
making the report. The central question is whether the
reports were made for the purpose of blowing the whistle,
i.e., to expose an illegality. We look at the reporter’s
purpose at the time the reports were made, not after
subsequent events have transpired. In part, the rationale
for looking at the reporter’s purpose at the time the
report is made is to ensure that the report that is claimed
to constitute whistle-blowing was in fact a report made for
the purpose of exposing an illegality and not a vehicle,
identified after
the fact, to support a belated whistle105
blowing claim.
Defined as such, the good faith requirement is a meaningful
concept and a significant limiting factor in potential whistleblower
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at subd. 3.
614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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cases. Indeed, the pure self-interest that characterized an
“internal” report that failed to meet the public policy requirement
may be just as serviceable as evidence in support of a good faith
defense.
While the good faith requirement alone may not eliminate the
possibility that opportunistic employees will abuse whistleblower
protection, there is also the statute’s requirement of a causal
connection between the report and challenged discipline or
discharge. This is, at least in theory, an ultimate failsafe to such
abuse. Usually, establishing legitimate reasons for an employee’s
termination that are wholly unrelated to the employee’s report is
an employer’s best defense to a whistleblower claim. The statute
explicitly requires this causal connection:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, or
otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:
(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an
employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer 106
or to any governmental
body or law enforcement official.
This requirement of a causal connection between report and
employment action should prohibit whistleblower protection from
becoming a cloak of immunity for poor performing employees.
But in the realities of practice, proving that there is no causal
connection is difficult and costly, because, in all likelihood, it is a
question of fact for a jury. Nevertheless, advising employers to do
what is necessary to establish the defense before discipline or
discharge is even more critical now that the public policy
requirement has been eliminated.
D. The Impact on Employment Counseling with the Elimination of the
Public Policy Requirement
In light of Anderson-Johanningmeier, Minnesota employment
lawyers, whether they counsel employees or employers, will need to
make some adjustments to the advice they give their clients
regarding whistleblower protection. For attorneys counseling an
employee who is contemplating reporting an employer’s suspected
106.

M INN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(a).
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violation of law, it is no longer necessary to take into account the
qualitative nature of the violation reported. As long as the report is
made in good faith, whistleblower protection exists. Moreover, an
employee who has been disciplined or terminated no longer needs
to be counseled that his or her ability to bring a claim depends on
the nature of the illegality reported.
For the attorney counseling the employer, AndersonJohanningmeier underscores the critical importance of the client
having solid, demonstrable proof that there was no causal
connection between an employee’s report of a suspected illegality
and a subsequent discipline or termination decision. This may
require more penetrating questions by counsel regarding the
client’s motivation for the proposed employment action than asked
before and, perhaps, less-than-welcome advice about the timing
and risks involved in disciplining or discharging such an employee.
It certainly requires solid, contemporaneous documentation and
possibly the establishment of “firewalls” between supervisors who
are dealing with a reported violation and supervisors who are
dealing with work performance issues. In short, the elimination of
the public policy requirement ought to cause defense lawyers to be
somewhat more conservative in their advice.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the public policy requirement was read into the
Minnesota whistleblower statute as a way to limit the law’s
applicability. The requirement had a reasonable basis and was
consistent with whistleblower protection of surrounding states and
federal law. However, it was a construction of common law found
nowhere in the plain language of the statute. As such, it had
uncertain parentage and questionable validity.
In Anderson-Johanningmeier, the Minnesota Supreme Court took
a hard look at the statute—-and the inconsistent case law
interpreting the statute—-and found no statutory basis to continue
to recognize the requirement. Beyond a simple application of the
canons of construction, the supreme court, through the
concurrence, also offered substantive criticism of the public policy
requirement’s reliance on subjective judicial determinations as to
which reported violations of the law are worthy of whistleblower
protection.
As Chief Justice Blatz recognized in her concurrence, the
Minnesota Legislature could, of course, amend the statute to re-
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introduce the defense. This may happen because the unequivocal
Anderson-Johanningmeier holding is much more noteworthy than the
somewhat-equivocal Hedglin holding.
That is, AndersonJohanningmeier is more likely to cause the legislature to revisit the
question of whether it intends Minnesota whistleblower protection
to be significantly more comprehensive in its protection of
employees than that provided under federal law and the common
law of other states. Of course, this is all yet to unfold. The
Legislature will determine whether Anderson-Johanningmeier is really
the final chapter for the public policy requirement in Minnesota
107
whistleblower law.

107. There was no proposed amendment to the Minnesota Whistleblower
Statute introduced in either house of the Minnesota Legislature during the 2002
legislative session.
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